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Foreword 
Population projections using arbitrary assumptions are made by many agencies, na- 
tional and international, and there is no obvious need for one more set. But what distin- 
guishes the projections of this Working Paper is the extremely wide range of assumptions 
in regard to births, deaths and migration with which the authors experimented. More- 
over, they give a more explicit rationale for their assumptions than is commonly present- 
ed. 
In effect the paper answers such questions as  "What if we have a new baby boom, 
short but intense, comparable to that of the 1950s?" "What if mortality improves spec- 
tacularly, not only at  the ages to  which people have lived up to  now, but far beyond those 
ages, say though discovery of a magic drug?" On the other hand they also ask "What 
happens if some vast epidemic, such as AIDS, ravages the population of Europe?" 
Its imaginative assumptions are unlikely to  be fulfilled, but none of them is impossi- 
ble. This new set of perspectives goes beyond the more conventional projections that are 
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POPULATION FUTURES FOR EUROPE: 
AN ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS 
Douglas Wolf, Babette Wils, 
Wolfgang Lutz and Sergei Scherbov 
1. Introduction 
Population projections are an important product of demographic analysis, for several 
obvious reasons. Whether in planned or market economies, governmental officials, per- 
sonnel directors, plant managers, educators, military leaders, and others all find it useful 
to  "know" how many people there will be, and what the characteristics (age, sex, educa- 
tion levels, family status, and so on) of the population will be, in years t o  come. 
Of particular concern is the delicate relationship between people and their physical 
and natural environments-as the numbers of people grow, so does the usage of resources 
and space, as well as the accumulation of by-products-often in the form of wastes-of 
that  resource use. It is, in fact, a concern with future of population growth and its poten- 
tial environmental consequences which motivates the present paper, which is part of a 
larger effort undertaken a t  IIASA in recent years, one focusing upon the future of Europe. 
Here we examine several alternative population-growth scenarios for Europe over the 
coming decades; we do not comment upon the environmental consequences of the alterna- 
tive scenarios, but rather present them to  the larger community of futures analysts. 
The components of population dynamics are straightforward and few in number: 
births, deaths, and net migration. This is true whether we contemplate the regional, na- 
tional, or global level, except that  a t  the global level (under current transportation tech- 
nology) net migration must be zero. If we add t o  these three components an additional 
category of information, namely the size and structure (according t o  age and sex) of an in- 
itial population, i t  is a straightforward exercise t o  compute a projection of the future po- 
pulation in any year. An overview of what has become a standard tool for population 
projection can be found in chapter 11 of Keyfitz (1982). 
Despite the standardization of methods for population projection, projections remain 
a hazardous and error-ridden undertaking, and do so for the simple reason that  it is im- 
possible t o  correctly guess the future path of fertility, mortality, and net migration. It is 
possible to  make rather good guesses--especially for the near-term future and for com- 
ponents such as mortality rates, which have tended to show fairly regular trends over 
time. In recent years demographers have devoted some attention to  the analysis of ex 
post errors in population projections, and have identified some factors associated with the 
relative size of the error; see for example Keyfitz (1982), Stoto (1983) and Land (1986). 
But correct guesses remain in the realm of the impossible. 
In virtually all population projections it is the analyst's goal to calculate as closely 
as possible what time will reveal to be the actual path of the population. And, if not, this 
should be the goal, since the users of projections typically treat the numbers as answers to  
the question "what will happen?" Here, we attempt to  answer a very different question, 
namely, "what might happen?" Our object is to anticipate what might be major demo- 
graphic "surprises" of the coming decades, and then calculate what the population conse- 
quences of such surprises would be. Our attitude is that even unlikely surprises may 
nonetheless materialize, and that we should therefore contemplate a broad range of possi- 
ble (if unlikely) alternative scenarios. There are of course an infinity of such alternatives; 
in what follows we confine ourselves to an exposition of five rather extreme alternative 
scenarios, representing major departures from recent mortality, fertility, and migration 
experience in Europe. For reasons of data availability, elaborated later, we omit from our 
analysis the European parts of the Soviet Union. 
The outline of the paper is as follows: in the next section, we provide a context for 
the scenario analysis by describing the main demographic trends of postwar Europe; we 
consider mortality, fertility, and migration in turn. Section 3 describes our projection 
methodology, while Section 4 presents what might be labeled the "conventional wisdom" 
regarding Europe's future population. Section 5 presents our main findings, describing 
the assumptions underlying the alternative scenarios and presenting the corresponding 
calculations. A brief summary and discussion concludes the paper. 
2. Demographic Trends in Postwar Europe 
In order to set the stage for our scenario analysis, we present a brief survey of demo- 
graphic developments in Europe, focusing upon the post-World War I1 period. The demo- 
graphic trends and patterns exhibited during this period are important for two reasons: 
first, they have much to do with the composition of the present population of Europe, 
which in turn is the starting point for any population projection; and, second, it is only in 
the context of recent trends that the analyst can develop plausible assumptions regarding 
the future paths of the demographic parameters which serve as inputs into the projection. 
In this section, we present an overview of mortality, fertility, and migration patterns. 
Mortd i ty .  Age-specific mortality rates-for example, the number of deaths to  men 
(or women) in a given age-group during the year, divided by the mid-year population in 
the given age and sex category--display a distinctive pattern. The pattern begins with 
rates which are somewhat high during the first year of life, but which drop off rapidly and 
remain low throughout childhood and into early adulthood, and then climb slowly, and 
later (around ages 50 and onward) progressively more rapidly. I t  is common to  surnmar- 
ize mortality rates in a single, simple index, the expectation of life a t  birth. This is the 
average number of years that  people would live if they experienced the given age-pattern 
of mortality rates throughout their lifetime. 
Figure 1 displays life expectancies by sex for Europe, with actual data  for 
1950-1980, and the assumed path of life expectancy for 1985-2020. These data  are used 
in the United Nations medium-variant population projection, discussed in more detail 
later. The two key features of Figure 1 are, first, the fact that  women on average live 
longer than men and, second, the fact that  the female-male differential has been widening. 
Moreover, the UN projections assume that the female-male differential will continue to  
widen throughout the projection period. According to  the UN assumption, female life ex- 
pectancy will be around 80 years by the year 2020, a level which has already been sur- 
passed in Japan. 
The sex-specific curves shown in Figure 1 mask considerable underlying diversity. 
One example of diversity is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows regional patterns of male 
life expectancy in Europe. According to  this figure, in 1950 male life expectancy in North- 
ern and Western Europe was several years greater than in Southern and Eastern Europe. 
But by 1970 male life expectancy in the southern region had risen to  that  of the western 
region; in the meantime male life expectancy stopped growing in Eastern Europe. In fact, 
detailed analyses of country data  have shown that  death rates of working-age men have 
actually declined in some countries; these declines would have translated into a reduction 
in overall life expectancy, had they not been offset by improvements in infant and child- 
hood mortality [see, for Poland, Okolski (1985), and for Hungary, Carlson and Watson 
(1988)l. The corresponding region-specific curves for women (not shown) reveal a pattern 
which is similar to  that  found in Figure 2, though not so exaggerated. 
While the age-pattern of mortality described before has remained fairly stable (ex- 
cept when upset by exogenous factors such as war), future mortality patterns could be 
quite different. It has been argued [especially by Fries (1980)l that  future developments 
in adult mortality will cause the life-table-that is, the pattern of survivorship to  
specified ages-to become essentially rectangular. That is, there will be a tendency for 
Figure 1. Life expectancy in Europe, by sex. 
deaths to  become concentrated a t  a theoretical maximum life span (of around 85 years), 
a t  which age most people will die. It has been argued that  this progress is-and will 
be--due to  improved personal health habits in combination with better medical care. 
Others, however, noting recent scientific advances in health care and medical research, 
have speculated that  large and dramatic breakthroughs in mortality may emerge, raising 
the prospect of a "Methuselah society" in which large numbers of people live to  unpre- 
cedently old ages [see, for example, Vaupel and Gowan (1985)l. 
In one of our scenarios we postulate developments in old-age mortality which com- 
bine elements of both the "fixed life-span" and the "Methuselah" viewpoints: we suppose 
that  mortality after age 60 will drop dramatically and rapidly, in a way suggestive of sud- 
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Figure 2. Male life expectancy in Europe, by region. 
den technological breakthroughs, but that the span of human life will remain bounded 
above (at age 100). 
Another recent development in mortality, still too early to  be reflected in the pub- 
lished (and highly aggregated) data displayed in Figures 1-2, is the AIDS epidemic. The 
extent and ultimate consequences of AIDS remain largely unknown. Ln consequence, the 
literature contains a broad range of estimates and prognoses regarding the future path of 
the disease. We have picked from the literature one of many possible sets of assumptions 
regarding the dynamics of AIDS, and include this as one of our scenarios. 
Fertility. During the last century all European populations experienced a funda- 
mental change in their reproductive pattern. Demographers call this change the secular 
fertility transition, which together with a substantial mortality decline constitutes the 
demographic transition. This describes the fundamental change from a fertility pattern in 
which, for married couples, the number of children was virtually uncontrolled to  a situa- 
tion where couples more or less consciously determine the family size they want. Under 
the earlier regime, for married women the number of children was essentially a function of 
biological factors. Now, conscious planning together with the availability of efficient con- 
traceptive methods makes personal family size desires the crucial variable. 
The qualitative transition from "natural" to "controlled" fertility, which in most Eu- 
ropean populations took place early in this century, resulted as well in a significant 
change in the average number of children born to  women over the course of their repro- 
ductive life. The total fertility rate (TFR) is a measure of the mean number of children 
born per woman as implied by observed age-specific period fertility rates. In most 
Western European countries the TFR declined from about 4-5 children per woman in 
1900 to 2-3 children in the 1930s. In Southern and Eastern Europe the fertility transition 
took place somewhat later. 
Figure 3 gives the trends in age-specific fertility rates for Finland from 1776 to  1984. 
In this figure one can clearly see the pre-modern fertility fluctuations a t  a high level, fol- 
lowed by a steep secular decline lasting until about 1940. 
In most European countries the economic depression of the 1920s and 1930s was ac- 
companied by very low fertility levels. The war which followed lead t o  considerable 
heterogeneity among the countries and particularly strong annual fluctuations in fertility. 
After the end of World War I1 all European countries showed an upsurge in the number of 
children, known as the postwar "baby boom". This phenomenon of strongly increasing 
fertility levels in almost every country was quite unexpected by demographers. In many 
countries we can identify two maxima, one right after the war and one in the early 1960s. 
The two examples given here (Figures 3 and 4) show two extremes in the timing of the 
baby boom.' In Finland the highest fertility levels were observed in 1947-1948, when the 
T F R  reached almost 3.5 (equal to  the level of 1916-1918) followed by a constant decline 
until recently. In the German Federal Republic fertility peaked in 1964 with a T F R  of 
slightly above 2.5; for the 12 years from 1957 to 1969 i t  was a t  a level of above 2.2. After 
1969 fertility in Western Germany had declined to  levels somewhat under 1.4, where it 
now appears to  have stabilized. 
 he sources for Figures 3 and 4 are Lutz (1987) and Lutz and Yashin (1987), respectively. 
Figure 3. Age-specific fertility rates in Finland, 1776-1981. 
What are the determinants of these trends in national fertility, and what can we 
know about future trends? Without going into the very extensive literature on fertility 
determinants, we will mention here only a few simple explanations. The secular fertility 
transition from uncontrolled t o  controlled fertility was largely accompanied by the transi- 
tion from an agricultural rural society to  a modern industrial society; children who 
represented additional help on the farm meant additional cost in an industrialized society. 
But equally important to  these economic changes were probably cultural changes: people 
started to  become more highly educated, to plan their life, and to  change emphasis from 
the quantity t o  the quality of children. The postwar baby boom is now understood by 
demographers as being t o  a great extent a timing phenomenon. Women who had delayed 
births during the war had them later. Concurrently, younger women started their child- 
bearing sooner than had previous cohorts. This compression of childbearing activity into 
a few years became the baby boom. The fact that  during this period marriage in Western 
Europe had became almost universal, and the mean age a t  marriage had declined, also 
contributed significantly t o  the baby boom. 
Figure 4. Fertility trends for the German Federal Republic. 
More recently marriage has become less popular and also the number of children 
born within marriage has declined, on average, due to changes in the value pattern and 
structure of our modern society. The changing role of women in the family, in society, and 
in economic activity seems to be closely associated with this recent decline; but so also is 
a cultural shift from orientation towards the family to individualism, an  observation 
sometimes called the "second demographic transition" (van de Kaa, 1987). 
It is usually assumed that  the marital fertility transition early in this century was an 
irreversible process; the irreversibility of the more recent changes remains unknown. For 
this reason we include two different fertility scenarios in our study, one assuming further 
steep fertility declines, and the other assuming the occurrence of another "baby boom". 
Immigration. The pattern of immigration to  Europe from year to  year since World 
War I1 has not been uniform. After a century of being a large net exporter of p e o p l e t o  
the New World-Europe gradually became a net importer of people since World War 11. 
This shift occurred in different ways and a t  different times for various nations. In gen- 
eral, net immigration became positive earlier in West and North Europe. Partly, this was 
due to a large influx of people from South Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. 
By the 1970s, perhaps as economic differences in Europe decreased, South European 
migration decreased. A large influx of workers and dependents from outside Europe con- 
tinued. Nations with a colonial past experienced a large influx from their ex-colonies-for 
example from Pakistan, India, and the West Indies to  Great Britain; from the Maghreb 
and West Africa to  France; and from Indonesia and Surinam to  the Netherlands. Other- 
wise, large groups came t o  Europe from the South and West Mediterranean nations- 
notably from Morocco and Turkey. This second group initially formed the new immi- 
grant category, "guest worker", meant to  work in the "host country" for a few years and 
then return home. But many did not return, and instead brought their dependents after a 
few years, to  remain permanently. 
Presently, the influx of immigrants has decreased, as economic and social problems 
in Europe have led to  an increasingly parsiminous distribution of new work permits. In 
those countries for which we had data, it appears that  ongoing immigration consists 
mainly of dependents or non-workers. Presumably, unless new workers arrive, this immi- 
gration will also gradually dwindle. A new, presently small, group of immigrants are re- 
fugees. That the decreased immigration cannot be caused by decreased pressure in send- 
ing countries (as was the case for past pan-European immigration, and probably for South 
Europe in the seventies) is rather obvious. The pressure from developing countries to  al- 
low immigrants into Europe is more likely to  increase than otherwise. As a concrete illus- 
tration of the historical trends reviewed here, Figure 5 is presented which shows the pat- 
terns of migration France from 1960 to  1984. 
The absolute number of immigrants in the past decades appears large. Net migra- 
tion to  EEC countries was a bit under 500,000 annually from 1960 to  1976 (Statistical 
Office of the EC, 1977). But relative to the total population net immigration has general- 
ly been small. Available statistics indicate that  during the peak years migration accounts 
for annual population increase of about 0.1 percent. One much higher figure-but still 
less than 0.5 percent-reflects a unique situation in the Netherlands when a mass exodus 
occurred from the colony Surinam the year before its independence. Moreover, in most of 
the period in question, net migration was much lower, equaling about 0.025-0.05 percent 
annual population increase. 
Once arrived, the immigrant population can cause further increase due t o  natural 
growth. Espenshade (1987) and others note that the immigrant population often ac- 
counts for nearly all of a nation's natural growth. There are two reasons for this. The 
first is the age structure of the immigrant population. Immigrants are typically concen- 
trated in the childbearing but low-mortality age group between 20 and 45; an example, il- 
lustrating the case of the German Democratic Republic in 1976, is given in Figure 6. 
Thus immigrants contribute substantially to  fertility while contributing very little to  
mortality, and this alone will cause an immigrant population to  grow relative to  the na- 
tive population. 
300 I----- - t o t a l  immigration number of work permits ---- number of resident 
permits t o  depend1 
Figure 5. Immigration into France 1965-1985. 
Source: Annuaires Statistiques. 
The second reason is higher fertility in the immigrant than in the native population. 
While data on immigrant fertility in Europe are difficult to  obtain, available examples- 
such as a TFR of 3.009 for foreign women in the Netherlands, compared to only 1.437 for 
Dutch women, both in 1984 (Frey and Lubinski, 1987)-indicate fertility levels which are 
considerably above that of the host population. Yet these high immigrant fertility levels 
tend to decline over time, becoming increasingly like those of the native population. In 
our scenario dealing with immigration, we assume that fertility differences between the 
immigrant and the host population vanish after 25 years. 
male 
,,,, female 
Figure 6. Age curve for migrants into the German Federal Republic in 1976. 
3. Methods 
As noted in the introduction, the methods of population projection are highly 
developed and fairly standardized. Our calculations use the usual components approach, 
in which the initial population is represented in terms of counts by 5-year age groups. 
The projection is carried out in 5-year calendar time units. In each time period, the pro- 
portion of each age group surviving until the next period is determined by the application 
of survival probabilities, which are in turn a function of age-specific mortality rates. 
Similarly, the number of newly-born people is determined by applying the appropriate 
age-specific fertility rates t o  women in the age groups for which childbearing is possible 
(generally, and, in particular, in our calculations, ages 15-49). The survivorship until the 
end of the 5-year period of babies born during the period must also be determined. And, 
finally, net immigrants in each age-sex group must be added to the population. 
Our calculations were obtained using the interactive microcomputer program called 
DIALOG, a full description of which can be found in Scherbov and Grechucha (1988). 
The DIALOG program is especially well-suited to  the problem a t  hand, the examination 
of alternative scenarios. As noted above, the projection mathematics are based upon 
birth and death rates which are specific to  each 5-year age group; the resulting schedule of 
rates is frequently called an "age-pattern" of mortality or fertility. Each pattern of rates 
can be summarized with a single index, such as the T F R  for fertility, or life expectancy a t  
birth, for mortality. Except as noted later, we specified our scenarios as trends in the 
respective indices, rather than in their individual age-specific components. The DIALOG 
program translates these assumptions into new patterns of birth or death rates by scaling 
up or down, as appropriate, the respective array of rates until the associated index agrees 
with the assumptions of the alternative scenario. 
4. Europe's Future Population: The Conventional Wisdom 
We have chosen to  present, as a representative of the "conventional wisdom" regard- 
ing Europe's future population, the projections produced biannually by the United Na- 
tions' Population Division; we focus in particular on the 1986 edition of these projections 
(United Nations, 1986). Our choice is partly dictated by convenience, since the UN pro- 
jections are available in machine-readable form and therefore very useful for analytic pur- 
poses. Moreover, the projections are presented not only by individual country but by re- 
gion and continent, including all of Europe (excluding the part found in the USSR) as 
well as four subregions (North, East, South, and West Europe). 
The UN produces three variant forms of its projections, a medium as well as low and 
high variants. These differ only in their assumption regarding fertility trends. We focus 
throughout on the medium variant, since, in the words of Keyfitz, "...[t]he interpretation 
of middle-variant projections as forecasts has been nearly universal among users" (1982: 
196). 
The essential ingredients of the UN projections are the initial population, and the as- 
sumed path of fertility and mortality rates. The mortality assumptions, summarized in 
the form of life expectancy a t  birth, were shown in Figure 1. The assumption regarding 
mortality is that  life expectancy will continue t o  increase, by about 4 years, reaching 
73.87 for men and 81.74 for women in 2020. 
AGE PYRClMID i n  1980 
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Figure 7. Age pyramid for Europe: 1980. 
The remaining information is presented in Figures 7 and 8: Figure 7 depicts the 
starting population, in the form of an age-pyramid for 1980, while Figure 8 is a graph of 
the medium-variant assumptions regarding fertility (the TFR).  Note that  the UN projec- 
tion embodies the assumption that  fertility, which has been falling steadily and rather 
steeply since 1960, will in the immediate future reverse its downward trend, rising slowly 
from 1.825 (in 1980) t o  2.045-almost the replacement level-by 2020. 
We reproduced the UN medium-variant population projection for Europe using the 
DIALOG program, the results of which are shown in Figure 9. Although the UN's own 
projections go only until 2025, we continued the projection to  2050, using the assumption 
of no change in fertility or mortality after 2025. According to  this projection, Europe's to- 
tal population will rise gradually until 2030, a t  which time it will reach 526 million, which 
represents a 8.6 percent increase (or, a 0.16 percent annual growth rate) from the 1985 
tfr 
Figure 8. Total fertility rate for Europe: 1950-2020. 
base of 485 million (recall tha t  the European part of the Soviet Union is excluded from 
our analysis). Figure 9 also plots three broad age groups-those 0-19, those 20-64, and 
those 65 and older. The number of young people is projected to  remain almost constant, 
while the working-age generation shrinks, and the elderly population grows dramatically, 
both in absolute numbers and in relative size. 
Although we present the UN medium-variant projection as a representative of the 
"conventional wisdom", we must point out that  the figures are not universally or uncriti- 
cally accepted by students of population. The UN's medium-variant projection has in 
fact been termed a "bright future" (Macura and Malacic, 1987:20) mainly in view of its 
absolute number 
x 1.000.000 
Figure 9. Projected European population, total and by age-group: UN medium-variant 
projection. 
assumptions regarding the future path of fertility. There is no obvious reason t o  suppose 
that  Europe's downward trend in fertility, a long-standing trend, will suddenly (and soon) 
reverse course, returning gradually to  the replacement level. As we have already indicat- 
ed, it is for this reason that  we include as one of our illustrative scenarios a continued 
downward trend in Europe's TFR. 
5. Europe's Future Population: Some Alternative Scenarios 
Assumptions. Our alternative scenarios consider some extreme possibilities for each 
component of population growth. For fertility, we consider two possibilities, another 
"baby boom", larger than that  of the postwar years, and (in our opinion, more realistical- 
ly), a drop of fertility to  the low levels currently observed in a few European countries. 
For mortality, also, we consider two possibilities; the first is a medical breakthrough 
(which we label, only partly in jest, a "magic drug") the effect of which is t o  reduce old- 
age death rates dramatically, and the second is a major epidemic-an extreme AIDS 
scenario. Finally, we examine the consequences of a major influx of immigrants, on a 
scale larger than experiences anywhere in Europe in the postwar years. 
The specific assumptions underlying each alternative are given below. 
(1) A new baby boom: the T F R  starts to increase from 1.825 in 1990 to  2.776 in 2000, 
and decreases again t o  1.825 by 2010. This would constitute a more dramatic, and 
more compressed, baby boom than that  actually experienced in postwar Europe. 
(2) Fertility decline: the T F R  continues t o  decline in Europe, to  an overall level of 1.4, 
a level already reached in some West European countries. 
The assumptions for scenarios (1) and (2) are depicted in Figure 10. 
(3) A "magic drug" is introduced on the market in 2000 which decreases mortality for 
those over 60 by 50 percent. 
(4) A major epidemic: in order to  represent a possible AIDS scenario, we note that  
while the present number of reported cases is about 6000 in Europe, the actual 
number of infections is assumed to be 40 times higher. It is assumed that  the 
number of infections doubles annually, and that  all of those infected die 10 years 
after infection, until half of the population aged 30-50 dies of AIDS. The other half 
is assumed to  be immune and remains unaffected. These assumptions correspond 
roughly to  the analysis presented by Platt (1987). Note that we apply the assumed 
mortality increases to  both sexes. 
The mortality assumptions used in scenarios 3 and 4 are shown graphically in Figure 
11. 
(5) A new wave of immigration: our last scenario postulates the occurrence of a turn- 
of-the-century burst of immigration larger than the one experienced in the sixties 
and seventies. From 1995 to 2004 there are one million immigrants annually. The 
age and sex structure is roughly historical: 55 percent male and 45 percent female, 
with age concentrated between 20 and 30. The immigrants' T F R  is initially twice as 
high as the European rate, then declines gradually to  the native level by 2025. Fig- 
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Figure 10. Total fertility rates for alternative scenarios: "baby boom", fertility decline, 
and UN medium variant. 
ure 12 shows the net immigration into the EEC from 1960 to 1976 together with the 
assumed magnitude of the "new wave" immigration scenario. 
The UN assumptions hold for those variables not included in the scenarios. Also, 
note that  each scenario involves only a single set of alternative assumptions. We do not 
explore the consequences of combinations of different assumptions, but these would be, for 
the most part,  additive. Thus the reader can readily determine the population that  would 
result if, for example, both the low-fertility and the high-immigration scenarios were to  
materialize. 
Figure 11. Life expectancy, by sex, for alternative scenarios: "magic drug", AIDS epi- 
demic, and UN medium variant. 
Results. The population paths implied by each of our alternative scenarios is pic- 
tured in Figures 13-15. In each, the UN medium-variant projection is also shown for pur- 
poses of comparison. In Figure 13, which shows the total population, we see that  three of 
our scenarios-the baby boom, "magic drug" and new wave of immigration-imply more 
growth than does the UN projection, while the other two-fertility decline and AIDS- 
imply a sharp reduction in Europe's population. It is interesting t o  note that  the three 
growth scenarios are, in effect, scenarios for upward shifts in the conventional-wisdom 
growth path, followed by population trajectories essentially parallel to  the UN projection. 
a b s o l u t e  number 
x 1 , 0 0 0  
Figure 12. Immigration (in 1000s): 1960-1976 for EEC, and assumed volume for immi- 
gration scenario. 
In contrast, the fertility-decline and the AIDS scenarios both imply a sharp depar- 
ture from recent trends. In both cases, Europe's population peaks, a t  somewhat below 
520 million, around 2000-2005, after which it shrinks at  a rapid rate. 
The age-composition of Europe's future population differs dramatically across alter- 
native scenarios. Information on age structure is shown in Figures 14 and 15. Figure 14 
shows the percentage of the population in the 15-64 age group; this is the group from 
which most of the labor force must be drawn. Under all the scenarios, this percentage 




Figure 13. Projected European total population: six alternative scenarios. 
precipitous for the "magic drug" scenario, where the percentage below 65 is pushed down 
by the massive growth of the over45  population (see Figure 15). The "baby boom" and 
AIDS scenarios display more fluctuation, and more transitory changes, since in each case 
the underlying phenomenon occurs during a relatively compressed period of time. 
Figure 15, which depicts the percentage of the population 65 and older, for the most 
part mirrors the curves shown for the working-age population in Figure 14. Both the 
fertility-decline and the "magic drug" scenarios imply dramatic growth in the percentage 
of the population elderly; in the first case, the cause is the failure of the population to  add 
sufficient numbers of young people, and in the second case, the cause is a reduced tenden- 
% of total 
population 
Figure 14. Percentage of projected population aged 15-64: six alternative scenarios. 
cy for the older population to  die off. Note that  even under the conventional-wisdom pro- 
jection the percentage of the population elderly is expected to  rise a lot; our baby-boom 
and immigration scenarios do little to  change this feature, while the magic drug and 
fertility-decline scenarios merely amplify it. Only under the AIDS scenario does the per- 
centage elderly drop, and this it does during the years when those who died young from 
the disease would otherwise have entered the over45  group. 
% of total 
population 
Figure 15. Percentage of projected population aged 65 and over: six alternative 
scenarios. 
6. Summary and Discussion 
This paper has discussed the possible path of Europe's population to  the year 2050, 
employing an alternative-scenario approach. Our objective has been not to  guess what 
the most likely path of population growth will be, but rather to  identify a range of possi- 
ble, albeit extreme or unlikely, paths of population development. We have addressed all 
of the basic elements of population dynamics: birth rates, death rates, and the net inflow 
of immigrants. A characteristic of all three elements historically has been the occurrence 
of unexpected events-"surprises"-especially in the area of fertility. We have no reason 
to suppose that  the future is without surprises, and have tried to anticipate some of them 
in our various scenarios. 
Among the surprises-or reversals of trend-we have contemplated are: an end-of- 
century baby boom of unprecedented size; continued decline of fertility to a point a t  
which Europe overall is well below replacement; a dramatic and rapid drop in old-age 
mortality rates; a worst-case AIDS scenario; and a new wave of immigration. Of these, 
the fertility-decline and the AIDS scenarios lead to the most dramatic results, in each case 
implying rapid shrinkage in the size of Europe's population after the year 2000, accom- 
panied by pronounced changes in the age structure of the population. The other 
scenarios, and particularly the immigration scenario, depart rather little from the 
medium-variant projections produced by the United Nations. 
Even though our scenarios are not meant to represent the actual, or even the likely, 
future, they can still be instructive about what the future may hold in store. And, equal- 
ly importantly, the scenario analysis helps to identify what sorts of "surprises" would 
have large consequences, and what sorts would not. For example, even though we as- 
sumed immigration on an unprecedented scale, our high-immigration scenario led to only 
modest growth in Europe's population, beyond what would be expected on the basis of 
the conventional-wisdom view. Even a very large baby boom does not lead to  an abrupt 
shift in the population growth path. 
What does turn out to make a big difference in Europe's future is the fertility- 
reduction and the AIDS scenarios. In both cases, precipitous population decline begins to  
occur early in the next century. Yet we again point out that  in our view, the fertility- 
decline scenario is more realistic than that  assumed in the UN projections: we have mere- 
ly assumed a continuation of the fertility trends of the last two decades, until all of Eu- 
rope (on average) reaches a low level of fertility, a level which several countries have al- 
ready reached (or gone below). Moreover, the AIDS scenario that  we modeled, while not 
necessarily the "conventional wisdom", corresponds to  assumptions and assertions being 
made in the existing literature. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that  whatever the future holds, it will include 
changes in fertility, mortality, and immigration simultaneously, not singly as in the 
scenarios we analyzed. As mentioned before, some of the changes would be additive-for 
example, the immigration results can simply be added to  the fertility results, to obtain 
the population implications of the two assumptions together. Some of the changes, how- 
ever, would not be additive. In particular, if an  AIDS epidemic on the scale examined 
here were to materialize, it is quite possible that  fertility rates would drop as well, as p e e  
ple adopted a more cautious attitude towards sexual activity. Our results indicate that  
such an interaction would only accelerate the implied shrinkage of the population. 
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